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F
RIENDSHIP IS IN BAD SHAPE. LAST YEAR THE
American Sociological Review published a
study demonstrating that between 1985 and
2004, the number of Americans admitting they
have no one with whom to discuss important mat-
ters nearly tripled. But lacking a confidant is only
part of the crisis. Americans seem to have lost their
ability to maintain even basic neighborliness. One
of the study’s authors observed how starkly
Hurricane Katrina revealed the problem: “‘That
image of people on roofs after Katrina resonates
with me, because those people did not know
someone with a car,’ said Lynn Smith-Lovin, a
Duke University sociologist who helped conduct
the study. ‘There really is less of a safety net of
close friends and confidants.’” Similarly, the New
York Times recently ran an article documenting the
anxiety twenty- and thirty-something New York
men feel when they spend time with one another
doing things other than watching sports or cruis-
ing for women. The “man date,” where two or
more men may wish to enjoy conversation over
dinner and wine, is considered “too gay” for most
men, it seems.
Americans, even when not stranded on their
rooftops, seem to have lost the art of friendship.
They seem to be unsure just what to do with a
friend. They know how to unite their bodies, but
not their souls. They seem to have forgotten a rich
heritage in Western thinking on the meaning of
friendship. The ancient Greeks thought that
friendship at its best involved conversing about
the noble and the good. Thus Xenophon reports
Socrates proclaiming: “Just as others are pleased
by a good horse or dog or bird, I myself am
pleased to an even higher degree by good
friends… and the treasures of the wise men of old
which they left behind by writing them in books, I
unfold and go through them together with my
friends, and if we see something good, we pick it
out and regard it as a great gain if we thus become
useful to one another” (Xenophon, Memorabilia, I,
vi,14 ). The Greek philosophers spoke frequently
about friendship, which for them culminated in
conversation about the good and noble.
The Bible mentions friendship less, but its inter-
mittent references are critical. For instance, as Liz
Carmichael observes in her exhaustive Friendship:
Interpreting Christian Love, notable Christian
thinkers have been drawn to John 15:15 as a central
text on Christian love. There, Jesus proclaims his
disciples will no longer be disciples, but friends.
Friendship also plays a strong role in the rela-
tionship of Adam and Eve. In Genesis chapter two,
that enigmatic “second creation story,” we hear in
greater detail than chapter one what kind of world
humans are to enjoy. God gave Adam enormous
freedom in naming all his sustainers or counter-
parts. We share in this freedom, and awesome
responsibility, when we name our children (or
when children name their pets). But to name entire
species! Adam’s ability to name presupposes that
he had an understanding of natural kinds—the
difference, say, between a dog and a cat—allowing
him to name species. Whereas we had to learn the
names of animal species from our parents, Adam
would have known the stark difference between a
world that is intelligible and significant, and one
that is not. 
Yet, the joy of learning natural kinds left
Adam incomplete. He acknowledges this incom-
pleteness in his first recorded speech, which hap-
pens to be a poem (in Robert Alter’s translation): 
This one at last, bone of my bones
And flesh of my flesh,
This one shall be called Woman,
For from man this one was taken 
(Gen. 2: 23).
In recent years this passage has been read as a
patriarchal assertion of female bodily dependence
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on male form. This passage and its subsequent
narrative, with its emphasis on the unity of flesh,
frequently gets recited at weddings (although
marriage has frequently been taken by numerous
Christians as the height of friendship).
However, the text leads us to conclude that
readings emphasizing gender inequality and mar-
riage do not preclude us from viewing it as a state-
ment of Adam’s noetic participation in friendship.
Adam has been naming, and therefore contem-
plating, natural kinds. In co-creating with God, in
making a world of signifiers for humans, he has
been exercising reason, his highest faculty. Yet, this
world of signifiers is not fully significant. Adam
needs a conversation part-
ner. In Alter’s literal and
musical translation, we
hear Adam’s first words
(which, as his first words,
ineluctably draw the reader
into the conversation):
“This one at last.” Adam
has been searching for his
own kind with whom not
only to “go forth and multi-
ply” in the bodily sense, but
also in its noetic sense of
praising and understand-
ing creation. Even though
lord of creation, Adam
finds creation incomplete without someone with
whom to communicate its glory. Since Adam
speaks in verse which begins and ends with the
feminine indicative pronoun, z’ot, “this one,” we
are also given to understand that Adam under-
stands his own kind (human) but also the femi-
nine which completes his maleness. That he
speaks in verse suggests the importance of poetry,
in the sense of music and of stories that engage
both body and soul, in the conversation among
human beings, including friends. Perhaps this is
why, in his Vulgate, Jerome translates Paul’s poli-
teuma in heaven (Phil. 3:20) as conversatio, a term
meaning not only conversation, but also conver-
sion and dwelling with. “Citizenship,” as trans-
lated by the King James, seems too cramped. 
But between our creation and our salvation,
how on earth are we supposed to conduct
friendly conversation in that fulsome sense?
Three recent books go some way to uncovering
the reasons for friendship’s current crisis, as well
as offering some remedies.
Joseph Epstein’s Friendship: An Exposé, is a
chatty reflection on the contemporary state of
friendship. He thinks people today (himself espe-
cially) either have too many friends or they are
lonely, which ends up being two effects of the
same cause. He observes that modern life is so
fluid that our friends are like our wardrobe: just
as we wear a piece of clothing for a while and then
remove it, so too we interact with our friends
(actually acquaintances) for a few hours, but we
fail to know the whole person. Unlike Adam who,
in sizing up Eve, had a pretty
good understanding of who
and what she was, our “dif-
ferentiated friendships” take
in a fragment of our friends
but not the whole person.
Unlike Adam who gained
self-knowledge in “at last”
finding Eve, our superficial
encounters deprive us of
self-knowledge. As a result,
Epstein observes that we try
to compensate by seeking
even more friends, which
ends up undermining our
sense of friendship with any
one of them. Our friendships end up feeling like
burdensome obligations. While friendships do
carry their obligations (friendship includes jus-
tice, according to Aristotle and Aquinas), they do
not necessarily feel like obligations. Friendship
implies reciprocity, but friends do not keep score-
cards. No one proclaims “at last” when they meet
their obligations. 
Epstein is critical of some of the modes of
interaction we moderns frequently mistake for the
essence of friendship, including intimacy, compas-
sion, and confession. He also regards marriage as
its rival. Epstein provides a thumbnail definition
of friendship as affection, shared interests, past,
values, enemies, and delight in one another’s com-
pany (21). But intelligent conversation is his focus,
and telling stories about friendship is more impor-
tant to understanding it than philosophical theo-
ries. Citing political philosopher Michael
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Modern life is so fluid that
our friends are like our
wardrobe: just as we wear a
piece of clothing for a while
and then remove it, so too we
interact with our friends
(actually acquaintances) for a
few hours, but we fail to
know the whole person.
Oakeshott, Epstein finds friendship “dramatic,”
meaning our experience of it is inescapably partic-
ipatory (45). He does not think friends need to
share belief in God (20), by which he seems to
reject a central definition of friendship (of Cicero,
and shared with Augustine) as “agreement on
things human and divine combined with goodwill
and love.” However, Epstein insists that friend-
ship depends on having in common “certain
unspoken assumptions about what is and what
isn’t important” (38). The ability of friends not to
have to worry about debating the fundamentals of
their common worlds places friendship “beyond
intimacy,” which enables them never to “run out
of things to talk about or run out of good feelings
for each other” (115). If friendship begins with
respecting another’s dignity, getting “beyond inti-
macy” entails reaching their (vaguely defined)
“central fire” which ensures community (163).
Friendship involves speech, but it is beyond
speech. His understanding of friendship is closer
to that of Cicero and Augustine than he lets on.
Epstein tries to be countercultural in criticiz-
ing our democratic demand that friends be equal.
Quoting Francis Bacon, equality produces rivalry
about which unequal friends need not worry:
Achilles and Patroclus, Johnson and Boswell, Don
Quixote and Sancho Panza, and so forth. One
could add Socrates and his friends, and recall that
while Jesus preferred friend to disciple, only He is
the Son of God. Epstein prizes his own friendship
with the sociologist, the late Edward Shils, who
was older and whom Epstein regards his intellec-
tual superior. Epstein became Shils’s friend after
Shils and his equal, novelist Saul Bellow broke off
their friendship. Even so, the way Epstein
describes his relationship suggests Shils regarded
Epstein—despite inequalities in age, learning, and
experience—his equal in having “a nearly com-
plete understanding of his motives and his reason-
ing and, finally, the meaning of his life” (31). At
last, Shils may have proclaimed in sizing up
Epstein, he has found this one.
Stephen Miller’s Conversation: A History of a
Declining Art provides a history of conversation
and shows the philosophical and cultural sources
of the contemporary crisis in friendship. He iden-
tifies two broad enemies of conversation, and
therefore of friendship: 1) the active life, which
explains why the American founders were not
good conversationalists (they were too busy
founding their republic), and the obstacles com-
mercial life places on it (too busy forging utilitar-
ian relations); and 2) various forms of enthusi-
asm, which historically took the form of the Holy
Spirit in Christianity and its parallel in the
Romantic cult of authenticity, according to which
nonverbal gestures convey one’s essential
humanity more adequately than verbal gestures.
Examples of authenticity include Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s symbol of natural man, which was
inspired in part by his contempt for the conversa-
tionalists of French court life, Ernest
Hemingway’s laconic heroes, the nihilism of
1960s counterculture and its belief that authentic
humanity comes through LSD and sex, the pro-
clivity of rock stars and rappers who rely exclu-
sively on vulgarities to express their sincerity
about whatever it is they are sincere about, and,
finally, the cult of individualism whose devotion
to expressing one’s “unique point of view”
diminishes conversation into a series of “inter-
secting monologues.”
Miller’s conversationalist defenders of friend-
ship are the “clubbable men” of the English and
Scottish Enlightenment: Adam Smith, David
Hume, Samuel Johnson, and Jonathan Swift. The
pubs, clubs, and coffee shops of London and
Glasgow were the seedbeds of liberty and
Enlightenment because such men were spirited
conversationalists whose discussions covered the
breadth of human experience. They surpassed the
universities as sources of innovative thought.
Their participants were more serious about their
conversations than the French courtiers, who,
according to English and Scots, were more inter-
ested in playing verbal games than in engaging in
serious discussion (though Montaigne and La
Rochefoucauld earn praise for their insights).
Yet, for all of Miller’s criticisms of anti-intellec-
tualism, he admits that reason alone does not
make for good conversation. Raillery, which Swift
called “the finest part of Conversation,” keeps con-
versations both serious and ongoing. Raillery
involves teasing, testing, antagonizing, and even
making temporary enemies out of one’s conversa-
tion partners (5). For Epstein, and likely for Miller,
raillery is more characteristic of male conversa-
tions (when they bother to converse) than it is of
females. Even so, it has a way of cementing atten-
tion toward one’s friend and to the topic of the
conversation.
Miller sees raillery as a key index of how polit-
ically stable a country is: “how much its citizens
can engage in good-humored disagreement” (308).
However, raillery shares with conversation’s
prominent enemies, the active life and authentic-
ity. Like one committed to action, raillery demands
assertiveness and risking that one’s plans will
come to naught. In conversation, raillery tests the
other’s manly appetite for defending and asserting
one’s viewpoints, thereby risking enmity with
one’s partner. Like authenticity, raillery asserts
one’s personality. 
For the ancient Greeks (whose raillery, espe-
cially that of Socrates,Miller overlooks although he
summarizes the more docile parts of their conver-
sational skills), raillery is an expression of thumos,
the spirited part of the soul. Thumos gets aroused
when one is compelled to defend oneself and those
one loves, as well as one’s viewpoints. It enables
political life. For Aristotle, it is the source of friend-
ship and enmity (he and Epstein observe that one
hates the most those one previously has loved). As
a result, it needs to be harnessed by reason so those
two faculties of soul can perfect each other.
With Epstein and Miller, we find friendship
sustained when reason rules the soul but also par-
ticipates with what is above reason (“beyond inti-
macy,” “central fire”) and what is below reason
(thumos). Liz Carmichael’s study of the central
place of friendship in Christian love shows how
this stretching out reaches its most differentiated
expression in the Christian Trinity.
Carmichael laments that Christians have not
sufficiently availed themselves to the New
Testament friendship teaching. Her book covers
the variety of ways Christian thinkers through the
centuries have nevertheless drawn from John
15:15. While their neglect has numerous sources
(monasticism being a major one), she points to the
Lutheran theologian Anders Nygren’s study Agape
and Eros, published in the 1930s, as having a corro-
sive effect on Christian understandings of friend-
ship in the twentieth-century. For Nygren, friend-
ship is antithetical to Christian love, because it is
too self-interested. Carmichael’s study of friend-
ship in the Christian tradition disputes that claim
in a number of ways, including the equation of car-
itas and friendship in Aquinas and in modern per-
sonalist accounts of the Trinity.
For Aquinas, “in the love of friendship, a
man’s affection goes out from itself simply” (114-
16, referring to Summa Theologiae I-II.28).
Friendship as conversatio mimics the divine com-
municatio of God giving Himself to Himself. In ST
I-II.38.2,Aquinas precisely formulates this commu-
nicatio: “But the Holy Ghost receives his proper
name from the fact that He proceeds from Father
to Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the
Holy Ghost.” From this, one may infer that nam-
ing has something to do with friendship, that is,
love and understanding a “who” in addition to a
“what.” Aquinas develops a set of symbols show-
ing how we can get into that conversation.
Paradoxically,we cannot, strictly speaking, get
into that conversation because there is no starting
place for friendship in the sense that our affection
for a friend precedes our recognizing that affec-
tion: “the appetible object [i.e., one’s friend] gives
the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself,
which consists in complacency in that object; and
from this follows movement toward the appetible
object. For the appetitive movement is circular”
(ST I-II.26.2). In more familiar language, this
means God’s love for us enables our love for Him,
but it also points to the mystery of friendship
according to which we necessarily find ourselves
loving our friend before we recognize it. The
appearance of our friend impresses his form onto
us, which “complacency” (complacentia, the pleas-
ure we experience in adapting our love toward the
beloved) moves the appetite to desire union,
which gets experienced as joy when achieved.
Adam would have experienced “complacency”
when he beheld Eve “at last.”
Aquinas says we experience uniting with our
friends as “mutual indwelling” (mutua inhaesio).
We are “in” each other insofar as we have
impressed our form on one another’s soul—on
intellect and on appetitive power. We know we are
“in” each other when we delight in one another.
We also know we are “in” each other when we
“strive to gain an intimate knowledge of every-
thing pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate
into his very soul” and where “it seems as though
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he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person
of his friend” (ST I-II.28.2). Aquinas’s insertion of
“it seems” indicates that the identity of friends is
imperfect, or more precisely, they are both identi-
cal and different, and enough of each to allow for
meaningful conversatio. The desire for complete
identity is in principle antithetical to the practice of
friendship, which, involving people sharing a
common story, allows each individual to write his
own lines in response to the other. 
Friends also suffer ecstasy and zeal toward one
another. Ecstasy literally
means being taken out of our
place. It is what we experi-
ence by having our friend’s
form impressed upon us, our
affection going out of us sim-
ply, experienced as delight in
him and the desire to provide
him his good, for his own
sake. Jesus tells us the con-
summate act of friendship is
to lay down our life for them
(John 15:13). Zeal expresses
what love shares with thu-
mos: “the more intensely a
power tends to anything, the
more vigorously it with-
stands opposition or resistance” (ST I-II.28.4). We
love what helps our friend, and hate what harms
him, including external harm as well as vice.
Carmichael’s description of Aquinas clarifies
how his twentieth-century critics failed to clarify
how agape is to be as self-emptying as they hoped.
Aquinas shows our ability to share ourselves
depends on maintaining that sense of self.
However, Carmichael believes Aquinas did not go
as far as modern thinkers in explicating the friend-
ship of the Trinity. While the modern age invented
the isolated individual, it also “thereby opened up
a path into a wholly new exploration of human
inter-subjectivity” (159). Modern personalism,
expressed variously by Kierkegaard, Simone Weil,
and others, is more faithful to the Trinity than
Aquinas, for whom one still “looks up” and
thereby emphasizes God the Father, rather than
“looking down” to the Son. For personalists,
friendship is expressed through those concrete
encounters with individual and particular per-
sons. “Who” takes full precedence over “what,” or
in Martin Buber’s terms, our friend is a “Thou” not
an “it.” In preserving the Christian obligation to
love one’s fellow human being, personalist
thinkers have developed a variety of ways to
express a fundamental stance with which we face
“the Other.”
Kierkegaard distinguishes between “finding
the perfect person in order to love him” from the
Christian ideal of “being the perfect person who
boundlessly loves the person he sees” (159). John
Burnaby considers the Good
Samaritan as the paradig-
matic human encounter,
where particular love is gov-
erned by the condition of
need itself (165); Simone
Weil considered that “cre-
ative attention” requires us
to transcend our need of seek-
ing our good and to experience
“a miraculous supernatural
transcendence which enables us
to ‘wish autonomy to be pre-
served’ in ourself and the other”
(170). Finally, all these thinkers
insist on the irreplaceability of
persons (175). These personal-
ist accounts seem to share an appreciation that human
beings do not choose their friends so much as find them
along the paths they take, and that those paths are
ineluctably formed by the chance encounters with our
friends. This insight recalls Augustine’s observation,
made in On Christian Doctrine, that our neighbor is he
who “by chance” is nearby. Our lives and our friend-
ships are formed by the manner in which we respond to
our chance encounters whose meaning only becomes
apparent as we live out our lives with those friends.
In some ways Carmichael overstates the nov-
elty of the modern turn toward personalism. It can
already be found in Aquinas, as well as in
Augustine (as Peter Burnell has recently demon-
strated). Moreover, behind the modern language
of personhood one can find Kantian notions of
dignity and its assertion of autonomy, which in
many ways conflicts with Trinitarian love. What
can be gained by examining the modern turn
toward personalism, however, is its reflections on
the differing modes of encounter that chance
Augustine observed that 
our neighbor is he who “by
chance” is nearby. Our lives
and our friendships are
formed by the manner in
which we respond to our
chance encounters whose
meaning only becomes
apparent as we live out our
lives with those friends.
brings about, and how those modes express our
friend’s irreplaceability. Each friendship encounter
is experienced as a unique event. Yet, we share a
latent though rarely understood humanity that is
drawn out in those unique encounters. Some post-
modern formulations (which celebrate chance)
make friendship nearly impossible because they
deny another self for one to love and understand,
as well as one loving and understanding. While
postmodernism’s skepticism toward a stable self
in many ways contributes to Miller’s observation
that contemporary conversations are in fact “inter-
secting monologues,” Epstein’s common sense
experience of friendship with Edward Shils,
whose life’s meaning Epstein divined, shows post-
modernism goes too far in its skepticism. 
Rather, personalism reminds us that friend-
ship reveals itself in its concrete practices and iter-
ations. Their descriptions of how friends connect
with one another are vaguer than the delicately
paradoxical language Aquinas uses to describe
“mutual indwelling.” This vagueness may be due
to the isolation modern individuals experience,
reflecting ambivalence as to how two souls unite.
For Aquinas, friends mutually inhere with one
another with their affection and with their intel-
lects. With their intellects, we seem noetically to
touch on a mysterious inner core or “central fire”
(Epstein), but also through the more day-to-day
encounters we describe to one another in a more
reflective mode. The noetic and the reflective are
inseparable.
Epstein rightly alerts us to the importance of
stories about friends (35). Stories are the way the
reflective part of our intellects participates with
our friends. We share stories with our friends
while simultaneously writing them with our
friend. It always seems that after friends finish
performing some action, like backpacking in the
Canadian Rockies, they feel the need to talk about
it, frequently over drinks. Stories express and are
examples of individuals participating with one
another in a grander whole. Aristotle alludes to
this when he writes: “And elsewhere Odysseus
says that this is the best pastime, when human
beings are enjoying good cheer and ‘the ban-
queters seated in order throughout the hall listen
to a singer.’” (Politics 1338a28-30, quoting Odyssey,
9.5-6). Ancient and Christian thinkers like
Augustine frequently compared the aspired-to
harmony of a city to a story or poem, and some of
our best statesmen have been good story-tellers.
Abraham Lincoln and Sir Winston Churchill were
great story-tellers. Churchill’s ability to tell stories
was prodigious (many to Franklin Roosevelt, who
frequently lacked the energy, and later the desire,
to listen to them all), and he also wrote numerous
books chronicling England’s “island story.” Lesser
statesmen write only memoirs, but even these
begin as stories they tell those around them.
Story-telling seems implied in Aquinas’s evo-
cation of the names of the Trinity because those
names are of persons, that is, of relations of entities
that are neither species nor particular instances (ST
I.20). It seems also the lesson to draw from Adam’s
first recorded speech, which was a poem inviting
us into the drama of humanity. However, the fluid-
ity of modern life is a profound obstacle to our abil-
ity to live these stories with one another. We share
chapters, sentences, a few fragmentary clauses, but
the story as a whole is elusive. 
Because stories seem difficult to share, people,
out of lonely desperation, frequently seek a short-
cut into the “central fire.” Out of loneliness, the
ecstasy and zeal about which Aquinas speaks gets
deformed into erotic excitement, as well as the
variations of Romantic authenticity Miller dis-
cusses. Zeal, unhinged from reason, gets
expressed as rage and the sullenness of the lonely
individual in the mob. Yet, Epstein points to the
noetic vision of his friend Shils at the poignant
moment when they both recognized they under-
stood each other. That is the moment when their
stories, their personalities, reveal themselves as a
whole, an experience similar to witnessing the cli-
max of a play. Many of us have had those
moments of recognition (or had experiences we
thought were such moments, which mistake fre-
quently causes confusion and heartache). 
For the most part, though, we settle for inti-
mations of such wholeness, which usually
expresses itself in our desire for our friend’s
physical presence. Epstein and Miller speak of
the special importance of physical proximity
with friends. Gestures, eye contact, and simply
sitting nearby not only amplify verbal meanings
in conversation, but they also embody the human
world in which speech is made: Adam had to see
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Eve;Aquinas notes the proper name for the mem-
ber of the Trinity that was born is “Son.” We fre-
quently think of physical presence as an embodi-
ment or instantiation of something greater (like
the body serving as the instrument of the soul).
Conversely, physical presence evokes wholeness,
shorthand for a complete story. Churchill liked to
have face-to-face dealings with foreign leaders,
because it afforded each party an opportunity to
stake his honor and to demonstrate their under-
standing of each other. Similarly, Elizabeth Telfer
notes that liking someone (the prelude to loving
them) is a matter of sizing them up, seeing if, like
a painting, they “hang together” well in a unity.
But we never fully see their unity because theirs
is never fully present even to them and ours is
never fully present even to us.
The challenge of friendship then is to find a
way to articulate the possibility for mutual
indwelling in its appetitive, noetic (experiencing
the “central fire”), and reflective modes (stories) in
a way that acknowledges the limits of how mod-
ern man can remedy his isolation. Nostalgic
yearning for a communitarian and rural past is
inadequate and even dangerous. Such an attempt
needs also to acknowledge that modern man
seems to like a good part of his isolation, his unso-
ciable sociability as Kant said, because that pre-
serves his autonomy. Yet, is not the point of friend-
ship to balance autonomy and love for another?
Or is the virtue teaching of Aristotle and Aquinas
irreducibly different than Kantian ethics? Does
autonomy require that we stay well away from
our friend’s “central fire” lest we get burned? Kant
cited this as one of the reasons he considered
friendship a “minor virtue” and why it plays a rel-
atively insignificant role in his moral thinking. The
ethical state is governed by rules, not by friend-
ships. Yet friendship is more humanly satisfying
than rules and obligations. For this reason friend-
ship will remain a central aspiration, if a problem-
atic one, in our lives. A
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